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Introduction
This case study reports on a survey (or, more exactly, a series  
of surveys) concerning ‘integrity at work’ within the Belgian 
federal government2. These surveys were conducted in the 
period 2010-2013 by researchers of the Leuven Institute of 
Criminology (LINC) at the KU Leuven, albeit in close 
cooperation with the Office of Administrative Ethics and 
Deontology (Henceforth the AED Office)3 within the 
Ministry of Budget and Management Control. This office 
was established in 2006 (then, as Office of Integrity 
Monitoring) and is responsible for the development of 
integrity policy within the federal government.4 This means 
that the office (1) advises ministers on federal integrity 
policy, (2) formulates proposals to ministers on the 
implementation of federal integrity policy and (3) follows 
up on the evolution of integrity policy both at national and 
international level.5 The AED Office is also responsible for 
the implementation of the ethics code of the federal 
government and for the coordination of the regulations 
concerning conflicts of interest.6 This survey was conducted 
to support the AED Office in these tasks. It is important to 
emphasise that the survey was essentially an academic 
exercise. Yet, in addition to offering data for scientific 
research, the survey also offered useful information to both 
the AED Office and the participating organisations’ 
management about the implementation of integrity policy 
and about the prevalence of unethical behaviour. It also 
intended to make the survey’s participants more aware of 
the importance of integrity and integrity policy. The survey 
was explicitly not intended to be an instrument of 
accountability towards controlling actors or the public.  
The confidentiality that was necessary to ensure valid survey 
results (see below) prevented the wider publication of the 
results. 
The study was conducted in three consecutive waves: the 
first wave (2010) in 12 central ministries, the second wave 
(2011) in two additional central ministries and the third 
wave (2013) in 22 agencies (public social security 
institutions, public utility institutions and scientific 
institutions).7 Overall, a large part of the Belgian federal 
government was covered: 14 of the 17 ministries and 22 of 
the 48 agencies. These surveys fit into a broader line of 
survey research within the Leuven Institute of Criminology.8 
For example, an earlier version of the survey was conducted 
in 20 organisations within the Flemish government in 2007 
(Geeraerts et al., 2008). Other studies were conducted in the 
security unit of a transport organisation (2012) and in 14 
local police agencies (2014-2015). 
This case study reports on the background, methodology 
and results of that survey. Yet, before delving into the actual 
survey, it is useful to briefly offer some general background 
about integrity policy in the Belgian federal government. As 
for perceived corruption levels, Belgium’s position in the 
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index9 
was 15 out of 174 in 2014, beneath the Nordic countries and 
neighbouring countries like the Netherlands and Germany, 
but higher than France and Spain. As for the general state of 
integrity policy in Belgian public administration, it is 
important to emphasise that Belgium is a federal country 
with many policy competencies devolved to regional 
parliaments. Each has its own government and 
administration with the autonomy to develop their own 
integrity policy. This case study focuses on the federal 
administration only. While the administration has, 
naturally, always had some essential elements of integrity 
policy such as an ethics code and disciplinary procedures, 
the move towards an explicit integrity policy only really 
started at the turn of the 21st century. A number of scandals 
about corruption and some dramatic cases of government 
failure in the 1990s created openness and willingness for 
reform, as exemplified by a large project of administrative 
reform in the federal government called Copernicus and a 
drastic reform of the police system. The latter was part of a 
broader attempt to improve policy making in this policy 
area, for example by installing a strategic planning cycle for 
criminal policy. ‘Anti-corruption’, with both repressive and 
preventive dimensions, was chosen as a strategic priority 
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within that planning cycle. In fact, the establishment of the 
AED Office in 2006 fitted the preventive dimension of that 
policy. The fact that anti-corruption policies featured so 
highly in the strategic plans can, at least partly, be  
explained by pressures from the OECD (e.g. the 1997 
OECD-convention10), the Council of Europe and other 
international actors. These pressures also led to improved 
anti-corruption legislation. As a result of all this, Belgium 
now has a fairly developed legal framework to support and 
enforce integrity among federal public servants (Stinckens & 
Maesschalck 2012, p.105). This framework includes a general 
ethics code (‘deontological framework’), legislation on the 
mandatory publication of mandates by senior politicians 
and public servants, and the recent installation of a 
reporting system with protection for whistle-blowers. Yet, 
in spite of the existence of these formal instruments, there 
is still important work to be done. For some instruments, 
implementation is still very limited. A case in point is the 
very weak implementation of the plans for the installation 
of internal control and auditing systems, although there are 
some very recent signals that this might be improving. 
Likewise, it remains to be seen whether the efforts to 
increase awareness about the risks of conflicts of interest 
have actually changed attitudes in practice. A persistent 
problem is the lack of overall coordination among the many 
actors who play a part in integrity policy within the federal 
administration. Finally, it is important to note that there is 
no administrative investigative capacity within the federal 
government. When the Hoog Comité van Toezicht was 
abolished, the police adopted its judicial investigations but 
no actor adopted the responsibility for administrative 
investigations at a federal level. The example at the level of 
the Flemish regional government (where administrative 
investigations are the responsibility of the agency ‘Audit 
Vlaanderen’) shows that it is both necessary and feasible to 
have such an actor complementary to the police who would 
remain responsible for judicial investigations.
Monitoring, auditing and evaluation of the federal 
administration’s integrity policies is very limited. The AED 
Office tries to monitor integrity policies within the 
ministries and agencies, but does not do so in a systematic 
way and depends on the willingness of ministries and 
agencies to offer information. In fact, the survey discussed 
in this case study is the most systematic attempt until now 
to do that kind of systematic monitoring. The Ministry for 
Personnel and Organisation (P&O) also organised some 
surveys with some limited relevance to integrity policies. 
The obvious examples are the staff satisfaction surveys 
organised by P&O at the request of ministries or agencies. 
While these do not explicitly measure unethical employee 
behaviour or aspects of integrity policy, they do probe for 
aspects like working conditions or work climate that might 
be relevant for integrity management. P&O also provides an 
instrument, sent to the ministries and agencies every two 
years, that serves as an inventory of the management tools 
used by the federal organisations. This probes for some 
aspects relevant to integrity policy such as the presence of 
an ethics code and the use of risk analyses.
While the AED Office and the P&O Ministry’s activities are 
limited to monitoring, there is one case of genuine external 
auditing of integrity policies. The Belgian national audit 
office (the Rekenhof or Cour de Comptes) conducted several 
external ‘thematic’ audits of the federal administration’s 
integrity policies. In 2007, integrity policies within the 
federal government were studied on the basis of a survey 
sent to all federal central ministries as well as the federal 
police.11 In 2009, the same study was repeated in five public 
social security institutions, public utility institutions and 
scientific institutions.12 In 2012, the integrity policy within 
five units within the Ministry of Finance13 - the largest 
ministry within the federal government - was audited.  
In 2015, an ethics audit was performed in the Ministry of 
Mobility and Transport.
Scope of the survey
Overall set-up of the survey
As mentioned above, the survey was essentially an academic 
activity. The collected data were to be used for a PhD 
project14 and for academic publications (e.g. Wouters & 
Maesschalck 2014). In addition to this, the survey also 
intended to collect data on the state of integrity policies and 
integrity within the participating organisations that would 
be useful for the organisations to improve their integrity 
policy. As mentioned above, the survey was explicitly not 
intended as an instrument of accountability towards 
controlling actors or the public. 
The division of responsibilities was agreed from the outset 
of the study. The researchers of LINC would be responsible 
for the development, implementation, analysis and 
reporting of the study while the AED Office staff would be 
consulted for the development of the survey, would be an 
important partner in the implementation of the survey and 
would be a preferential partner in the reporting of the 
survey. Any specific consulting on the basis of the survey 
would be done by the AED Office, not by the researchers.
This division of responsibilities was considered crucial, 
given that the nature of the questions (e.g. asking 
respondents to report on unethical employee behaviour by 
themselves or their colleagues) required confidentiality. It 
allowed the researchers to guarantee that the databases 
containing the respondents’ answers would only be seen by 
the researchers and certainly not by anybody in the federal 
government. The results were only published as aggregated 
data and individual respondents could not be identified.  
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In addition to this anonymity of individual respondents,  
the researchers also guaranteed confidentiality of the 
cooperating organisations. The reports were not made 
public. The general reports were only sent to the senior 
managers of the participating organisations and the AED 
Office; the organisation-specific reports were only sent to the 
senior manager of the respective organisation (see below).
The following paragraphs will describe the practical aspects 
of the survey’s implementation and briefly address the 
contents of the questionnaire. It should be noted that this is 
the description of a standard approach that was not 
necessarily applied to all organisations during all waves. In 
some organisations, specific circumstances required 
exceptions to the standard approach. Moreover, the standard 
approach here was developed gradually during a learning 
process in the course of the study. Hence earlier waves of the 
study will not contain all elements (both in terms of contents 
of the questionnaire and its practical implementation) that 
are described below as the standard approach. 
Practical organisation of the survey
The study was conducted by means of an online 
questionnaire. This drastically reduced costs and thus 
allowed the researchers to distribute the questionnaire 
among very large groups. Most participants were invited to 
participate by an email with an individualised link to the 
questionnaire. Those who did not have a personal email 
address were invited by means of a hard copy letter with the 
address of an individualised link.15 The individualised link 
was thought to be essential because it prevented 
respondents from filling out the questionnaires several 
times and because it allowed respondents to interrupt the 
completion of their questionnaire and to continue where 
they left off, later. The individualised link also made it 
possible to present the respondent with the appropriate 
version (e.g. language, organisation) of the questionnaire. 
A ‘token table’ was used for the generation of the 
individualised links, particularly in the third wave. Each 
organisation had two ‘token tables’. The first table included 
the actual email addresses and names of the employees and 
was used by members of the organisation (typically by the 
contact person or by staff in the ICT department) to send out 
the surveys. It was not seen by the researchers. The second 
table, which was seen by the researchers, was an anonymized 
version of the first table. Specifically, it did not contain  
the actual email address or names of individuals or 
organisational units. Instead, the table contained an 
individual code (‘token’) for each respondent, the language 
of the respondent and a number that referred to his or her 
organisational unit. The researchers integrated this table 
with the dataset containing the actual survey responses.  
In this way the researchers would never see actual names, 
and the staff of the participating organisation, who had 
assembled the table, would never see the actual data. This 
division guaranteed that an individual’s responses would 
never be linked to his or her name or his or her 
organisational unit’s name. Nevertheless, the fact that the 
table contained a number that referred to the staff 
member’s organisational unit made it possible for the 
researchers to see, during the analysis, which respondents 
worked together in the same organisational unit without 
knowing the actual name of that unit.
Because personal data (albeit anonymized) were collected 
during the process of assembling the token table, because 
the questionnaire itself asked for personal data and because 
the survey was done within the Belgian federal government, 
the survey had to be authorised by the Belgian Commission 
for the Protection of Privacy. The commission demanded 
that staff members should have the opportunity to object 
against the transfer of their personal (albeit anonymized) 
data to the researchers. Hence, all possible respondents 
received a ‘pre-notice’ email informing them about the 
research and about the opportunity to object to the transfer  
of data. 
As for the practical organisation of the survey, each 
participating ministry or agency appointed a contact  
person with whom the researchers cooperated closely.  
The contact persons helped with collecting the background 
information about both the organisation (e.g. organisational 
chart) and the respondents (e.g. demographic information so 
as to assess representativeness of the response), helped with 
communicating the survey and motivating staff to 
participate. The contact persons of all participating 
organisations were introduced to the project during an 
introductory seminar, to which the senior managers of the 
organisations were also invited, and that was organised in 
cooperation with the AED Office. They also received a booklet 
containing all the information concerning the survey, 
confidentiality, the general and organisation-specific reports, 
etc. as well as a ‘communication package’ (e.g. containing 
exemplar emails). Following that introduction, they received 
several (typically 4 to 5) newsletters offering updates (e.g. the 
latest response rates, tips to increase response) and/or asking 
for additional information.
Many efforts were made to increase response. The contact 
persons were kept informed about the response rate of their 
organisation. Both the invitation email and the reminders 
emphasised the importance of participating in the survey 
and the relevance of the survey results for actual policy 
practice. Experience also showed the importance of 
non-written communication, such as the senior manager 
mentioning the survey during speeches or the contact 
person attending staff meetings across the organisation to 
announce the survey. The researchers also noted that 
smaller organisations with a motivated contact person had 
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a higher chance of achieving a good response rate. Two 
organisations that had the survey presented to their staff in 
a meeting also saw a considerably higher response rate. 
The study resulted in two types of reports. For each of the 
three waves, a ‘general report’ was published containing 
general, aggregated data for all participating organisations. 
In addition to that, each of the participating organisations 
also received an individual report. These results were 
presented at a closing seminar, organized in cooperation 
with the AED Office, to which the senior managers as well as 
the contact persons were invited. 
Contents of the questionnaire
A number of concepts were measured in all versions of the 
questionnaire. 
First, all versions asked questions about the respondents’ 
knowledge of specific aspects of integrity policy. The 
questions were adopted and sometimes adapted from the 
‘Integriteitmeter’ developed by the Bureau Integriteit Nederlandse 
Gemeenten (BING) (Kolthoff, 2007), but the answering scale 
was replaced by a more specific one. Two examples of 
items16 are: “How well do you know the ethics code that is relevant for 
you?” and “How well do you know the rules concerning confidential 
information?”. The answering categories were ‘I never heard 
of it’, ‘I know it exists, but I do not know its contents’,  
‘I know its contents diagonally’, ‘I know the contents well’ 
and ‘Not applicable in my organisation’. Second, a number 
of questions also asked about respondents’ perceptions 
concerning aspects relevant to integrity policy. Examples 
of items include: “People not conforming to the ethical standards of 
the organisation are disciplined” and “The organisation makes it 
sufficiently clear how we should behave”. Most of these questions 
were adopted or adapted from the ‘Integriteitmeter’ of BING 
(Kolthoff, 2007) and ethical culture instruments of Treviño 
and colleagues (Treviño & Weaver, 2001, p.661; Treviño, 
2007). In the third wave, a large number of items were 
added from the ‘corporate ethical virtues model’ (CEV-
model) of Kaptein (2008). Examples include, “In order to be 
successful in my organisation, I sometimes have to sacrifice my 
personal norms and values” and “Management is aware of the type of 
incidents and unethical conduct that occur in my immediate working 
environment”. All the questions were answered using a 
7-point Likert scale with labels varying from ‘entirely disagree’ 
to ‘entirely agree’.
A third concept measured in the questionnaire was 
organisational fairness. Research suggests that staff that 
perceive their organisation to be unfair are more likely to 
commit unethical behaviour (e.g. Locke, 2000; Gilliland, 
Steiner, & Skarlicki, 2001; Treviño & Weaver, 2003). The 
concept was measured by means of the ‘General Justice’ 
questionnaire of Treviño and Weaver (2003, pp. 267-292). 
Examples of items include: “In general, my organisation treats its 
employees fairly” and “Employees can count on being treated with 
courtesy and respect in this organisation”. Answers were 
formulated by means of the same 7-point Likert scale that 
was used to gauge perceptions. 
The importance of the fourth concept, ethical leadership, 
is almost self-evident. Ample research has suggested that 
staff members’ perception about their management’s 
integrity is an important antecedent of staff members’ 
ethical or unethical behaviour (e.g. Lasthuizen, 2008).  
Our operationalisation of the concept built on Brown and 
Treviño’s ‘Supervisory Ethical Leadership Scale’ (Brown & 
Treviño, 2006), using a shortened version of the Dutch 
version of this scale that was used in the ‘Integriteitmeter’ of 
BING (see also Delbeke et al., 2008) and a slightly adapted 
answering scale. The scale measures two aspects of ethical 
leadership: moral person (does the manager herself behave 
ethically?) and moral manager (does the manager stimulate 
and enforce integrity among staff?). Examples of items 
include “My direct supervisor sets an example of how to do things the 
right way in terms of ethics” and “My direct supervisor disciplines 
employees who violate ethical standards”. Answers were 
formulated by means of the same 7-point Likert scale used 
for perceptions and fairness. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the questionnaire 
also asked respondents to report on their own unethical 
employee behaviour (self-report). Specifically, respondents 
were presented with items describing ‘incidents at the 
workplace’ and for each of them they were asked “How often 
have you engaged in the following behaviour in the last 12 months?”, 
with the instructions emphasising that it had to be 
intentional behaviour performed during the job. Items were 
adapted or adopted from the ‘Integriteitmeter’ of BING (see 
also Delbeke et al., 2008) and Maesschalck (2004). Some 
examples of items include “Improper use of confidential 
information” and “Bullying a colleague”. Other items were new. 
Examples are “Bending rules or procedures to get results faster” and 
“Strictly following rules when this is actually absurd”. For 
methodological purposes, the list of items not only contained 
unethical employee behaviour but also some more 
‘desirable’ behaviour, for example “Giving up a lunch break”.  
As for the answering scale, respondents were presented with 
the options ‘0 times’, ‘1 time’, ‘2 times’, ‘3 to 5 times’, ‘6 to 10 
times’, ’11 to 20 times’, ‘more than 20 times’ and ‘not applicable’.
A few concepts were only measured in some of the surveys.
In the first wave, the self-report of unethical employee 
behaviour was complemented by a measurement of the 
respondents’ attitude towards those types of behaviour. 
Specifically, for each of the types of unethical employee 
behaviour, respondents were asked to indicate on a 0 to 10 
scale how acceptable they considered that behaviour. 
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In the third wave, the self-report was complemented by a 
proxy-report and a victim-report. The proxy-report 
presented respondents with largely the same types of 
unethical employee behaviour as the self-report, but asked 
respondents “How often has this event occurred in the last 12 months 
in your unit?”, with the instructions emphasising that it had 
to be intentional behaviour performed during the job. 
Respondents were presented with the options ‘never’, 
‘seldom’, ‘sometimes’, ‘often’, ‘very often’ and ‘not applicable’.  
The victim report asked respondents how often they had 
been victim, in the last 12 months, of unethical employee 
behaviour such as bullying, discrimination, etc. The 
respondents were presented with the same options as  
the self-report with the exception of ‘not applicable’.
Also in the third wave, a shortened version of Maesschalck’s 
(2004) adapted and translated version of the ‘Ethical 
Climate Questionnaire’ (ECQ) of Victor and Cullen (1987, 
1988) was used. Answers were formulated by means of the 
same 7-point Likert scale used for perceptions, fairness and 
leadership.
With the Belgian federal administration being bilingual 
French and Dutch17, the questionnaire had to be made 
available in both languages. The original version of the 
questionnaire was developed in Dutch. The French translation 
was made by a professional translator of the Ministry of 
Budget and Management Control. This translation was 
evaluated by the researchers as well as by another person who 
had French as mother tongue. Any differences were discussed 
and decided upon by the researchers. Because some 
important changes were made to the questionnaire between 
the second and third wave, it was re-translated by another 
translator of the Ministry of Budget and Management Control. 
Important differences were discussed with another person 
who had French as a mother tongue and again, ultimately 
decided upon by the researchers.
Survey results
Response
The participating organisations were sampled on a purely 
voluntary basis. Organisations were invited and stimulated 
by the AED Office to participate by means of a letter, 
communications through a network of ethics officers and, 
in some cases, presentations within the organisation. 
Eventually 14 of the 17 ministries and 22 of the 48 agencies 
agreed to participate. This relatively high participation rate 
might have had to do with peer pressure among the 
management of the organisations as well as with the 
guaranteed confidentiality, not only of respondents, but 
also of the participating organisations. While 14 ministries 
and 22 agencies represent a large part of the Belgian federal 
public administration, there is certainly no guarantee that 
this sample is representative for the whole of the federal 
administration. For example, it is possible that 
organisations willing to participate have a stronger 
commitment to integrity, which might in turn impact the 
survey results. 
During the first two waves, half of the staff members18 
received the ‘integrity at work’ questionnaire. The other half 
was presented with another questionnaire that was to be 
used in preparation of a PhD.19 Of the 22,364 staff members 
who received an invitation to the electronic ‘integrity at 
work’ questionnaire, 7607 (or 34%) answered at least one 
question. 
In the third wave, no sample was drawn. All staff members 
received the ‘integrity at work’ questionnaire20. Of the 11,535 
staff members who received an invitation to fill out the 
questionnaire, 4,655 (or 40,3%) responded to at least one 
question and 3194 (or 27,7%) filled out the entire 
questionnaire. Hence, about one third of the respondents 
who started filling out the questionnaire stopped before 
they had completed, demonstrating how important it is to 
keep the questionnaire as short as possible. 
While these response rates are low, they are not uncommon. 
In a meta-analysis, Randall and Gibson (1990) found that 
the response rates in business ethics research ranged from 
10% to 96%, with a mean response rate of 43%. Baruch 
(1999, p.429) in an analysis of empirical research in five of 
the leading journals in the management and behavioural 
sciences in the years 1975, 1985 and 1995, found an average 
response rate of 55.6% with a standard deviation of 19.7. In 
another study, Baruch and Holtom (2008, p.1150) found an 
average response rate of 52.7% with a standard deviation of 
20.4 for organisational studies that utilised data collected 
from individuals. The relatively low response rates for our 
current survey might have had to do with the sensitivity of 
the topic (the self-report of unethical employee behaviour 
in particular) as well as with the length of the questionnaire. 
Moreover, research (e.g. Anseel et al. 2010, p.347; Shih & 
Fan, 2008) shows that the average response rates of online 
surveys are somewhat lower compared to the more 
traditional paper-and-pencil surveys. Sheehan (2001), for 
example, found in a study on response rates to e-mail 
surveys21 undertaken from 1986 to 2001 in journals devoted 
to marketing, sociology, communication, organisational 
behaviour, education, statistics and health, a mean 
response rate of 36.83%. Moreover, as researchers (e.g. Cook 
et al. 2000, p.821) have argued, the representativeness of 
responses is more important than the response rate in 
survey research. Therefore, each organisation-specific 
report contained information on representativeness.
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Some general results
This section will briefly address some basic, descriptive 
results. When interpreting these results, two important 
limitations should be kept in mind. First, the research 
reports on perceptions of policies and behaviour. These 
might differ from the actual policies and the actual 
prevalence of certain types of behaviour. Second, with a 
topic so sensitive, there is an evident risk of social 
desirability bias. Respondents might not have answered 
what they really thought, but what they thought to be the 
acceptable answer. Many efforts were made to avoid this 
bias (e.g. emphasis on anonymity of the respondent and 
confidentiality of the organisation, careful formulation of 
items and answering scales), but the risk, of course, 
remains. 
As for knowledge of specific aspects of integrity policy, 
the largest category (i.e. modus) for most items was ‘‘I know 
its contents diagonally’ (i.e. broadly speaking, in general), while 
only a minority reported that they knew the instruments’ 
contents well. In most participating organisations, the 
weakest scoring items had to do with conflicts of interest 
policies, with the rules and procedures concerning 
reimbursement of expenses or with the reporting channels 
to report indecent behaviour.
As for perceptions concerning aspects of integrity policy, 
the average score for most items on the 7-point Likert scale 
from ‘entirely disagree’ to ‘entirely agree’ was around the middle 
position ‘neutral’. The answering category ‘neutral’, together 
with the answering category ‘somewhat agree’, was also often 
the largest one. Items that scored relatively highly in most 
organisations typically had to do with the protection of 
information and with rules and procedures (e.g. for the 
registration of leave or for the registration of sick days). 
Items that scored relatively low had to do with whistle-
blowing arrangements, registration of unethical employee 
behaviour and rewards for ethical behaviour. 
As for organisational fairness, the average score for most 
items was also around the middle position and, for most 
items, ‘neutral’ and ‘somewhat agree’ were the largest 
categories. Moreover, as was found in earlier research (e.g. 
Treviño & Weaver, 2001; De Schrijver et al., 2010) the scores 
of the different items were not too different. 
As for ethical leadership, three general observations emerged. 
First, as was found elsewhere (e.g. Brown & Treviño, 2005), 
differences between the items are limited. Second, senior 
management typically gets lower scores than immediate 
supervisors. Third, staff tends to be more positive about its 
supervisor’s own ethical behaviour (the ‘moral person’ 
dimension) than about his or her efforts to stimulate and 
enforce integrity among staff (the ‘moral manager’ 
dimension).
The types of unethical employee behaviour were 
measured by means of a self-report (in all waves) and a 
proxy-report (in the third wave). As for the self-report, 
response choices were‘0 times’, ‘1 time’, ‘2 times’, ‘3 to 5 times’, 
‘6 to 10 times’, ’11 to 20 times’, ‘more than 20 times’ and ‘not 
applicable’. As expected, for most types of unethical 
employee behaviour, the largest category was ‘0 times’ and 
the average score for most items was between 0 and 1. As for 
the proxy-report, response choices were ‘never’, ‘seldom’, 
‘sometimes’, ‘often’, ‘very often’ and ‘not applicable’. For most 
types of unethical employee behaviour, the largest category 
was ‘never’ and the average score for most items was 
between 0 (‘never’) and 1 (‘seldom’). However, for some types 
of unethical employee behaviour (e.g. “Doing slow or sloppy 
work”, “Wasting company materials”, “Gossiping about a colleague”) 
the largest categories were ‘seldom’ or ‘sometimes’ and the 
average score was between 1 (‘seldom’) and 2 (‘sometimes’). 
Overall, for both the self- and proxy-report, two groups of 
items scored slightly higher. The first group concerns 
behaviour that is often not considered as unethical 
employee behaviour or as only a minor form of it, such as 
not exhibiting sufficient effort or taking a longer lunch 
break without permission. The second group concerns ‘rule 
fetishism’, which refers to an over-conformity to rules or 
norms that would be negatively evaluated by the majority of 
society. 
As for the victim-report (only in the third wave), most items 
also had ‘0 times’ as their largest category with average scores 
ranging between 0 and 1. Items that scored a bit higher (i.e. 
scores around 1) concerned a lack of respect by colleagues 
and bullying by colleagues. 
When formulated in such general terms, these results seem 
rather unsurprising. However, this becomes very different 
when the results are analysed at an organisational level. 
Particularly when those organisational-level results are 
compared with those of other similar organisations, the 
results present a much more useful basis for consulting 
management on how to improve integrity policies or other 
policies in general. Moreover, scores of the items measuring 
types of unethical employee behaviour(through self-report, 
proxy-report or victim-report) become much more telling at 
an organisational level. Taking a close look at the actual 
numbers of respondents who ticked categories other than  
‘0 times’ when reporting unethical employee behaviour can 
be particularly informative. Even where the overall average 
score of an item is very low, this might hide a small but 
significant group of respondents who do score high. When 
managers thus find out that a group of their respondents, 
even when it is a small group, reports to have committed, 
seen or suffered serious forms of unethical employee 
behaviour, this can act as a very useful wake-up call and an 
important stimulus for integrity policy improvements.
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Follow-up after the survey
Given the sensitivity of the survey questions, it was essential 
that the participating organisations and respondents had 
sufficient trust in the care with which their answers would 
be treated. That is why, from the outset, it was not only decided 
that individual respondents would remain anonymous, but 
also that the names of the organisations would be kept 
confidential. This also implied that the ‘integrity at work’ 
survey could not be used as an instrument of external 
accountability towards overseeing bodies or the general 
public. Instead, the survey results were used as source of 
information for management to improve their integrity 
policy, while the dataset was available for scientific research.
As agreed from the outset, the researchers’ role was finished 
once the reports were delivered and presented at the closing 
seminar. Yet, the organisations were invited to use the 
survey results to analyse and improve their integrity policy 
and the AED Office was available to consult and support 
them in doing so. No systematically collected data about 
this follow-up are available. The AED Office deliberately 
chose not to systematically monitor the follow-up because 
it wanted to avoid a perception of control (the AED Office is 
part of the Ministry of Budget and Management Control) 
and because it wanted to honour the principle that the 
survey would not be used as an instrument of 
accountability. Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence suggests 
that, in at least some organisations, the survey results were 
used to improve integrity policy. This was particularly the 
case in those organisations where an internal ‘entrepreneur’ 
(e.g. the ethics coordinator) was willing to push the topic 
on the agenda, sometimes helped by an external report (e.g. 
by the Rekenhof) or an incident. For example, in one large 
ministry, results about the survey were – together with a 
critical report by the Rekenhof that was published one year 
after the survey – used by management as leverage to 
introduce specific measures of integrity policy, including 
the introduction of specific ethics codes, courses in ethical 
leadership and an information portal about integrity on its 
intranet. This organisation also asked for a second wave of 
the ‘integrity at work’ survey (applied in 2014) so as to 
identify progress made and intends to organise further 
follow-up surveys in the future. 
Lessons learned
Based on our experience, a few general lessons can be drawn. 
First, during the course of the study, we drew some useful 
practical lessons. The network of local contact persons in 
the participating organisations proved to be a crucial success 
factor. The contact persons gave important suggestions to 
improve communication about the survey, passed on 
important information about their organisation and were 
very important in motivating employees to participate. Our 
experience also suggests that non-written, non-standardised 
communication, particularly by senior management, made 
an important difference in motivating participation.
Second, given the sensitivity of the topic, gaining trust of 
both the participating organisations and the individual 
respondents was essential, not only to achieve sufficient 
responses, but also to achieve honest responses. To ensure 
trust from individual respondents, great care was taken to 
ensure their anonymity. The use of the anonymized table of 
‘tokens’ (see above) and the ‘information wall’ between 
researchers on the one hand and ICT experts and contact 
persons of the organisation on the other, ensured such 
anonymity. They made it possible that, in spite of the 
personalised links that were sent, individual respondents’ 
answers could never be linked with their name. 
Confidentiality of the name of the organisation is equally 
important. Managers will be much more likely to stimulate 
their staff to report on misconduct if they know that this 
information will not be made public. Only with this type of 
confidentiality will the survey results be useful enough to 
support management in improving integrity policies. The 
disadvantage of this is that the survey cannot be used as an 
instrument of accountability towards overseeing bodies or 
the general public. For that purpose, other instruments are 
more appropriate. 
Third, if a large survey in many organisations is done by a 
research institute, then cooperation with a central actor 
will be invaluable, as our very smooth cooperation with the 
AED Office shows. The office offered important assistance in 
adapting the questionnaire to the specific circumstances 
and was crucial for its translation. The office also proved to 
be a very important partner in motivating organisations and 
then individual respondents within those organisations to 
cooperate. At the same time, efforts were made to ensure 
that this smooth cooperation did not get in the way of the 
organisations’ and respondents’ trust in the confidentiality 
of the organisational-level results and the anonymity of the 
respondents. 
Fourth, however important the safeguards just mentioned 
are, they also somewhat reduce the pressure on 
organisations to act upon the results of the survey. 
Specifically, the confidentiality of the survey results at an 
organisational level might reduce pressure on managers to 
take the results seriously. On the other hand, while 
managers do not have to reveal the actual survey results, 
they might still be stimulated to report on the efforts they 
made to address the issues raised by the survey. 
While the exercise as a whole proved to be valuable, there is 
also room for improvement, particularly with regard to 
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organisational learning on the basis of the survey. One 
obvious way to do so could be to consider the survey more 
as an instrument of accountability: results would be made 
public and organisations would have to explain publicly, 
and in detail, what they have done to address the issues 
raised by the survey. However, we would argue that this is 
not the way to go. The validity of the survey results strongly 
depends on the willingness of both the organisations and 
the respondents to cooperate and provide honest answers. 
We believe that willingness to participate would drastically 
decrease if the survey would be used in such a way. Other 
monitoring and auditing instruments are much more 
appropriate for purposes of accountability. Another, in our 
opinion, much more effective, way to increase learning 
would be to embed the survey in a broader government-
wide change project that would also include consulting, e.g. 
by a central actor. In the case study discussed above, the 
ministries and agencies only made limited use of the 
opportunity to receive consulting by the AED Office. This 
was probably because of the office’s limited means, but also 
perhaps because the office was situated in the Ministry of 
Budget and Management Control and thus still perceived as 
a controller rather than as a consultant.
In conclusion, the survey delivered useful information for 
managers and the collected data will be an important 
source for data-analyses for scientific purposes, e.g. to 
validate the measurement instruments or to test 
hypotheses. Meanwhile, there are many possibilities to 
continue the research. In one ministry, the same survey 
was implemented a second time and the plan is to repeat 
the survey at regular intervals so as to monitor progress. 
Similar arrangements could be made with other 
organisations. Such longitudinal research looks very 
promising, both for scientific and practice-oriented 
purposes. However, at least as promising is the idea of 
further, cross-sectional research by increasing the number 
of organisations involved. This would allow for comparative 
research within Belgium (e.g. with regional or local 
administrations), but of course also internationally. 
International comparative research is certainly challenging, 
particularly with the different languages involved, but our 
experience with the Dutch-French translation shows that 
this is not impossible. In the coming years, we will 
particularly be looking forward to opportunities for such 
comparative research.
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Notes
1 The authors wish to thank advisor-general Peter De Roeck of the 
Office of Administrative Ethics and Deontology and director-general 
a.i. Ben Smeets of the Ministry for Personnel and Organisation for 
their helpful suggestions. However, the responsibility for the 
contents of this chapter lies entirely with the authors. 
2 The Belgian federal government includes ‘federal public services’ 
and ‘public planning services’, which largely coincide with what 
elsewhere is called ‘ministries’. In this paper both types of 
organisations will be called ‘(central) ministries’. In addition to those 
ministries at the core of the administration, there are also various 
agencies in specific policy areas such as social security, public utility 
and science. The federal government also contains various other 
institutions, but these were not included in our survey. Examples are 
the federal police, the army, the judiciary and some public 
companies (e.g. Belgian railways). 
3 In this context ‘deontology’ does not refer to the particular ethical 
approach that is often associated with the philosopher Immanuel 
Kant, but to the meaning of the term ‘deontologie’ in French and 
Flemish (the Dutch that is spoken in Belgium), i.e. the duties of a 
particular profession (e.g. judges, medical doctors, but also public 
servants). 
4 www.begroting.be/NL/Pages/deontMission.aspx [consulted on  
June 3, 2015]
5 www.begroting.be/NL/Pages/deontMission.aspx [consulted on 
June 3, 2015]
6 www.begroting.be/NL/Pages/deontMission.aspx [consulted on  
June 3, 2015]
7 In 2014, a second measurement was conducted in a ministry that 
had been surveyed for the first time in the second wave. The 
contents and results of this second measurement are beyond the 
scope of this chapter.
8 For more information, see: http://www.law.kuleuven.be/linc/english/
research/copy_of_researchintegrityattheworkplace.html
9 http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results [consulted on June 29, 
2015]
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10 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions (adopted 21 November 1997, 
entered into force 15 February 1999). For more information, see: 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf.
11 164e Boek van het Rekenhof, Volume I, pp. 526-549.
12 166e Boek van het Rekenhof, Volume I, pp. 600-619.
13 Rekenhof, Integriteitsbeleid in de federale belastingadministraties, 
verslag, 34p.
14 For more information, see: http://www.law.kuleuven.be/linc/english/
research/researchtowardsanintegratedtheoryonunethicalbehaviour.
html
15 In some subunits of one participating organisation a paper and 
pencil survey was used because it was difficult to organise access to 
a computer for staff members.
16 All the quoted survey items in this paragraph are translations by the 
authors from the original Dutch version of the questionnaire.
17 In fact, Belgium has three official languages. Yet, because the third 
language, German, is used by only a very small minority and because 
most of those public servants would know one of the other 
languages, it was considered justifiable, although certainly not ideal, 
not to develop a German version of the questionnaire. German 
speaking public servants received a French version of the question-
naire, but they could easily change the language of the questionnaire 
into Dutch when they preferred this. 
18 With the exception of those who opted out following the pre-notice 
email.
19 This occurred as part of Wouters’ PhD project ‘Culture at work.  
A study of the impact of culture on unethical employee behaviour’. 
Data collection and data-analysis of this doctoral project have been 
completed and submission of the thesis is planned in October 2015.
20 It should be noted that in the third wave, in fact three versions of the 
questionnaire were distributed because a ‘missing-data-design’ 
(specifically the ‘three-form design’ of Graham (2012)) was used. 
This design presents reduced versions of the original questionnaire 
in such a way that statistical techniques during the analysis allow to 
present the results as if the complete survey had been presented to 
all respondents. 
21 Initially within companies and from 1994 onwards on the World 
Wide Web.
